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Abstract 
This article explains the peculiarities of institutional effects on growth rates in post-
communist countries. By proposing a certain dependence of the institution-growth nexus on 
the mode of institutional grafting, the distinction between drift-phase and path-breaking 
institutional change is introduced. Theoretical juxtapositions show that transition countries’ 
institutions built through path-breaking institutional reforms differ from those that emerge 
evolutionarily in the drift phase in a twofold manner in their relationship to growth. Growth 
rates of their economies are less likely to depend on the quality of legal institutions and are 
more likely to be a function of the maturity of political institutions. In addition, legal 
institutional change in the post-communist world is a product of the quality of the political 
environment to a greater extent than their drift-phase alternatives. These propositions are 
tested empirically based on a sample of 87 countries derived from the POLITY IV Project's 
website.  
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Post-Communist Transition as a Path Break: Comparing Legal Institutional Effects on 
Economic Growth between Path-Breaking and Path-Drifting Institutional Reforms   
 
1. Introduction 
Growth theory asserts that good formal institutions are conducive to rapid economic 
development. Empirical studies from economically developed and/or developing countries 
(Eicher & Leukert, 2009) largely support this claim (see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for 
an overview) but exclude the post-communist world as a unique group from the analysis 
(Bosworth & Collins, 2003). Research has been conducted independently on these countries 
and either substantiates conventional findings (see Aslund (2007) for a detailed overview). 
Or, it recognizes peculiarities concerning the effect that formal institutional frameworks have 
on economic growth, with the sign and strength of this impact varying depending on the 
phase of transition or the maturity of formal institutions (Fidrmuc & Tichit, 2009; De Melo, 
Denizer, Gelb, & Tenev, 1997; Falcetti, Raiser, & Sanfey, 2000).  
Studies stemming from post-communist countries go even further and entirely negate 
the claim that free-market formal institutions per se may lead to economic prosperity in the 
course of transition (Mau, 2008; Polischuk, 2008; Polterovich, 2008). Capitalist formal 
institutions lack compatibility with post-communist informal norms due to the countries' 
insignificant historical experience with democracy and free markets (Yasin, 2003) or due to 
unique features of their economic systems (Polterovich & Popov, 2006). The lack of strong 
political contexts, which assumes an independent political sector from the economic sector, is 
believed to hinder these countries from improving formal institutions, as a result of which 
many transition economies appear to be locked in an institutional trap: Any institutional 
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improvement is only associated with considerable economic and social losses (Polterovich, 
2008).  
Irrespective of the sign found in the relationship between formal institutions and 
economic growth, studies on transition economies possess one common feature: The impact 
of their formal institutions on growth is rarely tested in conjunction with developed and/or 
developing countries. An indirect comparison of results is hardly possible, since analyses do 
not use a standard set of conditioning variables and standard periods that would enable 
comparing findings. One should note that, in general, growth theory recognizes the existence 
of heterogeneity in the effects of formal institutions. It is well-established that the direction 
and strength of institutional impacts on growth vary depending on the maturity level of 
formal institutions (Barro, 1997; Fidrmuc & Tichit, 2009; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993) or a 
country’s level of economic prosperity (Eicher & Leukert, 2009; Lee & Kim, 2009). 
However, we doubt that these two explanations are exhaustive for all post-communist 
countries. Transition economies started their institutional reforms from a relatively similar 
platform in terms of their level of economic development and the type and degree of 
institutional maturity but ended up at very different success levels. We argue that the cross-
country variation of institutional effects on economic growth can also be attributed to the way 
in which such institutions were formed. The peculiar relationship of economic institutions to 
growth rates in transition economies can also be explained by the top-down nature of their 
institution building and socio-economic forces resulting from this process. 
This research’s main objective is to juxtapose the post-communist pattern of 
institution building with the pattern prevalent in other countries to identify implications that 
this mode of institutional grafting may have for a country’s growth dynamics. This study 
narrows the concept of formal institutions to legal institutions, such as property rights and 
contract enforcement legislation, since they are viewed as the key to economic growth 
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(North, 1990) and have been the least successfully reformed in post-communist countries 
(Aslund, 2007).  
 
2. Analytical Model 
Institutional economics distinguishes between two modes of institutional grafting: 
drift/evolution and critical junctures. The first describes institutional change that evolves in 
small cumulative stages within an established institutional path. The second considers radical 
changes that result from a country's exposure to shocks sufficient to break society out of the 
outmoded, suboptimal path and shift into a new one (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Drawn 
upon this distinction, we alternatively use the adjective "drift-phase" to describe the 
evolutionary type of institutional change and the term "path-breaking" when referring to 
institutional change at critical junctures.  
Each mode of institutional change is characterized by a distinct logic of the institution 
formation process, affecting economic development in a certain way. We introduce a new 
conceptual framework to juxtapose the two types of institutional grafting processes. Since we 
primarily focus on the post-communist world, our point of departure is derived from the logic 
of a free-market economy defined as an economic system based on the exchange of goods 
and services between economic agents at market prices (Aslund, 2007). Given this definition, 
we suggest that the formation of legal rules regulating economic processes can be understood 
by accounting for: (1) economic agents' values and attitudes concerning production and 
exchange processes; (2) the economic system's structural elements in which production and 
exchange occur; and (3) the behavior of actors who devise legal rules that regulate 
interactions concerning production and exchange. Based on this reasoning, we present 
institutional grafting as shaped by three forces that correspond to three dimensions of the 
institutional space: (1) cultural, (2) structural, and (3) political.  
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The first dimension is a cultural one (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2008; Portes, 2006) 
which is similar to North's concept of informal institutions (North, 1990). It includes 
prevalent values/norms that dictate right and wrong, as well as behaviors describing how 
likely it is that an individual’s conduct deviates from their good morals. The second 
dimension is structural and encompasses economic forces that reflect a country's economic 
infrastructure and the nature of economic arrangements. It predefines the extent to which a 
country's economic system is in tune with the logic of free-market economic processes and 
includes financial and banking systems, taxation, trade union, labor market institutions, 
industrial relations, etc. The third dimension is called political and includes two aspects: (1) 
political elites that deal with the formalization of new institutions, and (2) political 
institutions that comprise the rules that formalize the prevailing political interests into a legal 
framework.  
We argue that legal institutions should be commensurate with the logic of each of the 
three dimensions in order to function effectively and promote economic development. We 
further argue that the level of this congruence may vary across the phases of institutional 
change (drift/evolution or path-breaking/critical junctures) and can be a priory identified 
from the logic of institution building in each of these phases.  
The logic of drift-phase institutional change can be described as follows. As economic 
agents operate, they accumulate knowledge and experiences, which leads to technological 
advancements and further promotes the division of labor. This changes the organization of 
production processes in a country and shifts the structural dimension by establishing new 
industries, competition terms, pricing mechanisms, and conditions of resource allocation 
across various economic sectors. Profound change in the economic domain leads to 
transformations in how economic agents think and the values they hold. As a result, existing 
formal institutions are no longer adequate and commensurate with the existing economic 
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structures and values among economic agents, thereby raising market transaction costs 
(North, 1990). Contractual arrangements begin to create demand for institutional change that 
can lower transaction costs to exploit new opportunities (Pejovich, 1999). In trying to 
overcome the existing inconsistencies, economic agents introduce informal changes 
(Eggertsson, 1997) among formal “rules of the game” in order to make the institutional 
framework more flexible. If efficient and compatible with the interests of political elites 
(Portes, 2006), these changes are captured by the political system, which formalizes and 
legalizes them. As a result, they acquire the status of formal institutions. Private international 
commercial law provides an example of the drift-phase institutional grafting (Boettke et al., 
2008): The development of cross-culture exchange in 11th- and 12th-century Europe led to 
the spontaneous formation of the lex mercatoria, an informal system of customary law rooted 
in international commercial norms (Boettke et al., 2008). These informal institutions 
appeared to be effective and were later formalized into international commercial law.  
The drift-phase institutional change is hence likely to produce legal institutions that 
are congruent with our model's three dimensions: First, institutional change is initiated by 
economic agents through the bottom-up approach, as a result of which the new institutions 
are commensurate with the dominant values. Second, formal institutions are also congruent 
with the existing economic structure, since changes in the old institutions primarily occur as a 
reaction to shifts in the economic system or technologies. Third, the political dimension’s 
role in institution creation is inferior and restricted to formalizing institutions. This suggests 
that the political dimension’s quality only weakly determines the quality of institutional 
change. 
The logic of path-breaking institutional change differs substantially from the drift-
phase logic. The distinct feature of this mode of institutional change is that shifts in a 
country’s political system, often triggered by a political regime change, precede changes in 
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its economic system (Fidrmuc, 2003). Such reforms rarely require the population’s broad 
support, since the economic crisis caused by the previous regime’s shortcomings serves to 
justify introducing essential alterations in both political and economic systems (Olson, 1982). 
Alternatively, the population’s dissatisfaction with the current regime can encourage citizens 
to demand changes in both political and economic domains even if the incumbent elites resist 
such reforms. Radical political change can occur either through revolutions (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012), as recent events in Arabic countries demonstrate, or in a peaceful manner 
without wars and coups (Olson, 1982), as in the majority of post-communist countries during 
the collapse of socialism (Aslund, 2007).  
The radical political alterations require adjusting the institutional framework to the 
new political logic and promote an immediate introduction of an entirely new set of legal 
institutions, commensurate with the logic of the new political regime. Many pitfalls exist at 
various stages of carrying out institutional reforms. First, a shift in the political power and the 
initial immaturity of new political institutions may create a temporary vacuum of power and 
opportunities for political or economic elites to seek rents through the new legal institutional 
framework (Aslund, 2007). Second, even if this is not the case and the population's interests 
dominate in the process of building a new legal institutional framework, the quality of the 
new legal institutions ultimately depends on whether the political elites incumbent to handle 
the institutional grafting are sufficiently familiar with the new economic system and relevant 
legal rules. Third, since such knowledge and skills are often missing, it is likely that building 
a new institutional framework involves borrowing legal rules from countries with political 
and economic orders close to those desired. As a result, the new legal institutions become 
imposed from without (Pejovich, 1999), which in turn leads to two kinds of problems.  
On the one hand, implanting foreign institutions into another local context may 
disturb their congruence with characteristics of the structural dimension already in force. The 
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introduction of Western industrial legislation in many post-communist countries is a good 
example of this. The new rules proved inefficient for post-communist economic systems, 
since Western legislation was designed for postindustrial societies with a prevalence of 
medium and small businesses, while many CIS economies were characterized by the 
overrepresentation of large (state) enterprises (Polterovich & Popov, 2006). On the other 
hand, a similar incongruence may also emerge between the new legal institutions and the 
local cultural dimension (Boettke et al., 2008; Kyriazis & Zouboulakis, 2005; Portes, 2006). 
Because culture is unique, economic agents may perceive and interpret the newly imported 
legal rules through the prism of their specific values, as a result of which the meanings 
assigned by economic agents to the new laws might appear completely different from their 
initial context (Portes, 2006). This may further lead to a mutation of the new legal institutions 
(Vernikov, 2009) or low levels of their enforcement (Portes, 2006). 
The learning experience is expected to minimize or eliminate both kinds of 
incongruence (Nelson & Sampat, 2001). If policymakers design and introduce adjustment 
policies for the system’s orderly operation at each stage during the transition period, the 
incompatibility between the new legal institutions and economic structures is believed to be 
gradually narrowed. Similarly, if economic actors learn that adapting to the new legal 
institutions can expand their opportunity set, they may change their cultural values and 
behaviors. For instance, post-communist countries in which new democratic governments 
successfully introduced economic reforms experienced a rise in pro-democratic attitudes 
among citizens (Aslund, 2007). Successful reformers have also nurtured strong support for a 
free-market economy (Aslund, 2007). These learning processes imply, however, that there 
are lags between fundamental institutional change being initiated and the time when the 
relevant actors get the structures right (Eggertsson, 1997), producing a positive impact for the 
local economy only in later periods (De Melo et al., 1997; Falcetti et al., 2000). 
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Japan’s post-war reconstruction and transition from socialism to capitalism, which 
included changes in the political regime, major economic rules, and legislation, are good 
examples of the path-breaking approach to institutional grafting (Boettke et al., 2008). 
Overall, the path-breaking process of institution formation is unlikely to produce legal 
institutions that are congruent with our model's three dimensions: First, institutional change is 
profound and may include the top-down introduction of radical institutional reforms by 
implanting foreign institutions into the local systems. It is possible that these legal institutions 
will be incongruent with existing cultures, at least at the initial reform stage. Second, similar 
incongruence may also exist between the new legal institutions and the current economic 
structure for the same reason as above. Third, the political dimension’s role is superior and 
cannot be confined to legalizing new institutions but extends to their selection, design, 
introduction, and subsequent adjustments to the cultural and structural dimensions in place. 
The quality of new legal institutions might hence depend on the quality of the country's 
political change and the professionalism of political elites incumbent to handle institutional 
grafting under the new conditions.  
The above discussion suggests that the odds of ensuring congruence between the new 
legal institutions and the three dimensions differ substantially for the two modes of 
institutional change. This allows us to argue that economies might be endowed with different 
opportunity sets for growth, depending on the mode of institutional grafting through which 
the new legal institutions emerge:  
Proposition 1: Because legal institutions formed in the drift phase are more likely to 
be congruent with the three dimensions, they will more effectively enhance economic 
development than legal institutions introduced at critical junctures. The rationale behind our 
reasoning is that when this congruence exists, fewer frictions emerge in the interactions 
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between economic agents, making more transactions possible and leading to higher rates of 
economic growth. 
Proposition 2: Since the political dimension’s role is superior at critical junctures, we 
expect that the political dimension’s quality is of particular importance to the country's 
growth rate during the path-breaking institutional reforms. We identify two major 
mechanisms through which the political dimension's role manifests itself: (a) mitigating the 
negative impact of incongruence between the new legal institutions and the cultural or 
structural dimensions on economic growth (see Proposition 3) and (b) designing and 
introducing new legal institutions that are not only of good qualities but also congruent with 
the existing cultural and structural dimensions (see Proposition 4). 
Proposition 3: Since critical junctures are more likely to produce legal institutions 
that are incongruent with the cultural and structural dimensions, a country's growth rates 
become a function of the ability of political elites to adjust economic structures and/or 
cultures to the new legal institutions' logic. By contrast, the drift-phase institutional reforms 
produce legal institutions congruent with our model's dimensions and hence seldom require 
such adaptation measures or coordinating actions on the part of the government.  
Proposition 4: Since path-breaking institutional change at critical junctures 
presupposes a radical transformation of the entire institutional framework through a top-down 
approach, the quality of the new legal institutions becomes a function of the experience and 
skillfulness of political elites who handle the institutional grafting process. Their ability to 
choose the appropriate set of institutions determines the extent to which institution building 
processes are successful and newly imported legal institutions are of good qualities and 
congruent with local cultures and existing economic structures.   
Based on these propositions, we postulate the following hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 1: A positive impact of legal institutions on economic growth is greater 
when these institutions emerge in the drift phase rather than at critical junctures.  
Hypothesis 2: The political dimension's positive impact on economic growth is 
greater at critical junctures than in the drift phase of institutional grafting. 
Hypothesis 3: At critical junctures, the negative impact of incongruence on economic 
growth is smaller where the political dimension is of better quality.   
Hypothesis 4: The political dimension's positive impact on the quality of legal 
institutional change is greater at critical junctures than in the drift phase.  
 
3. Data and Method Description 
To test these hypotheses, we use Eicher’s and Leukert’s (2009) approach of splitting the 
sample into subsamples and conducting an empirical analysis for each of them. In forming 
our subsamples, we use the idea that institutional change at critical junctures presupposes a 
simultaneous transformation of the entire framework of formal institutions. Since such a 
radical transformation usually occurs because of a shift in the nature of economic relations 
and the logic of economic processes, we assume that only a political regime change can 
initiate path-breaking legal institutional reforms. This idea is also in line with the hierarchy of 
institutions hypothesis that views formal legal institutions as a function of political 
institutions within which a certain political regime is embedded (Eicher & Leukert, 2009).  
To identify whether a country has experienced recent changes in its political regime, 
we use the POLITY IV Project’s website (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), 
which provides information about political regime characteristics and transitions between 
1800 and 2012 with a polity score for a wide range of countries (see https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/68648/1/MPRA_paper_68648.pdf for a country choice description). The values 
of a country’s annual polity score range from -10 to 10, with values 6 and above denoting full 
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democracy and -6 and below denoting full autocracy. In our analysis, a country qualifies as 
being at critical junctures if: (1) there was a political regime change in which values shifted 
from at least -6 or below to at least 6 and above; (2) this change is rapid and occurred within 
a few years; (3) this change occurred after 1970. Any earlier transition is expected to produce 
institutions that would adhere to the local structural and cultural characteristics through the 
learning process and eliminate any incongruence. In this case, the new formal institutions 
would follow an evolutionary or drift-phase path in their maturation process; (4) the change is 
stable with no signs of reverting to the previous regime in the following years; (5) there have 
not been persistent fluctuations in the regime trend of more than 3 points since 1970. Regime 
trend fluctuations denote political instability, which is a separate issue with respect to growth 
analysis and has both positive and negative effects on economic development (Jong-A-Pin, 
2009).  
Since we are primarily interested in transition economies, our base path-breaking 
subsample only includes 21 post-communist countries that correspond to the above criteria. 
One should note that these countries are relatively heterogeneous in their historical trends 
(Soviet Union membership, experience with private property during communism, etc.) and 
present characteristics (EU membership, democracy types, etc.). We justify unifying them in 
one sample, because they all had a one-party political regime during communism with a 
centrally planned economic system. And they all underwent a profound institutional 
transformation with the same target: Transition to a free market economy and the 
introduction of democracy, which involved a radical change in the rules governing both 
political and economic processes. The fact that they slightly differ in their starting points does 
not contradict the purpose of our analysis, since the quantitative impact of initial conditions 
on the set of reforms and economic growth is small and tends to rapidly decline over time 
(Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, & Zettelmeyer, 1999; Falcetti et al., 2000). To ensure that the 
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empirical results are not unique to post-communist countries, we expand the path-breaking 
subsample by including non-post-communist countries that meet the above criteria, thereby 
increasing this subsample to 42 countries. 
Countries that have not experienced political regime change or have experienced 
profound but gradual change (each stage of change not being greater than a 3-point 
fluctuation in the polity score) are considered to be in the drift phase. The base drift 
subsample is limited to 22 old and stable democracies or autocracies to avoid a 
disproportionate subsample size. Since most of these countries are relatively advanced in 
their economic development, we expand this subsample by adding other developed and 
developing countries, augmenting this subsample to 45 countries. Appendix 1 lists the 
countries included in the analysis. One should note that some of these countries lack data on 
institutional or political indexes, which results in a smaller number of cases actually used in 
each type of analysis.  
We are primarily interested in comparing how formal legal and political institutions 
impact economic growth for the two country groups: evolutionary/drift versus path-
breaking/critical junctures. The quality of legal institutions is approximated through a 
contract enforcement and property rights protection index sourced from the 2007 Economic 
Freedom of the World annual report (see Gwartney, Lawson, Sobel, & Leeson (2007) for the 
detailed description of the index composition). The values vary from 1 (bad legal institutions) 
to 10 (good legal institutions). Formal institutions are considered to be good when they are 
clearly defined and well-enforced, which means that the institutional scores are closer to 10.  
The political dimension's quality is measured through the control of corruption in    
government, government effectiveness, the quality of regulation, and voice and 
accountability. All political indexes are sourced from the World Bank Group database and 
vary from -2.5 (bad political situation) to 2.5 (ideal political situation). The four indexes are 
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highly correlated, with the voice and accountability index showing the greatest uniqueness in 
its variance (due to space limits, we do not report factor loading and unique variances for 
political scores, but they can be sent upon request). We use this index to describe the quality 
of democratic settings in a country and hence the quality of political institutions. The three 
remaining indexes are combined by using the STATA predict option for factor analysis to 
construct a single measure of the policymaking quality which is expected to approximate the 
political elites’ quality. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables (see table 
1). 
[insert Table 1 here] 
We follow Tabellini (2008) in measuring the cultural dimension through the four 
aspects (control, respect, trust, and obedience) and source the relevant measures from the 
World Values Survey. Obedience represents the percentage of people in the sample who 
mentioned obedience as an important factor in society. Trust and respect are positive 
responses to questions about trusting most of the people and whether most people show 
tolerance and respect towards others. Control is operationalized through the question about 
how much freedom of choice and control people have over their own lives. The aggregate 
variable is constructed by adding up the values of control, respect, and trust, and subtracting 
the value of obedience. Since many countries included in the subsamples participated in one 
wave of the WVS, the cultural variable is available only on a cross-sectional basis.  
We follow Eicher and Schreiber (2010) in operationalizing the structural dimension 
and utilize the EBRD measures to construct a structural policy index, consisting of price 
liberalization, foreign exchange/trade liberalization, small/large scale privatization, enterprise 
reform, competition policy reform, banking sector reform, and non-banking financial 
institutional reform. We use the STATA predict option for factor analysis to create a single 
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construct. We limit the analysis of the structural dimension to the base path-breaking 
subsample, since the relevant data are only available for this set of countries. 
To test our hypotheses empirically, we use the dynamic GMM method proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). The procedure for 
applying this technique is well-documented by Eicher and Schreiber (2010), Lee and Kim 
(2009),  and Pääkkönen (2010). It requires that the equation is first-differenced to eliminate 
the heterogeneity in production functions and then an instrumental variable method is applied 
on the differenced model, with lagged values of the endogenous variables used as instruments 
for the variables themselves. To avoid an overfitting bias, we often restrict instruments to 
only few lags of the respective variables. We further use the STATA collapse sub-option to 
create one instrument for each variable and lag distance rather than one for each time period, 
variable, and lag distance. We also add the sub-options small to request small-sample 
corrections to the covariance matrix estimate. We calculate a two step estimator instead of a 
one step. Additionally, we use the sub-option noleveleq that invokes difference instead of 
system GMM. To demonstrate the correctness of the model, we report the number of 
instruments generated by the model, the results from a Hansen overidentification test, and the 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) serial correlation in the residuals. STATA command extabond2 
is used for calculating the model parameters.  
In line with Pääkkönen’s study (2010), we utilize yearly data for the period from 1996 
to 2008. We exclude the initial transition years from the analysis, since the outset of 
transition entailed profound systemic changes (Fidrmuc, 2003). We apply the same model to 
both subsamples while ensuring that a standard set of conditioning variables and standard 
periods are used. Our base growth model includes two variables: investment and inflation. 
Investment is included, since it is the key predictor in the majority of growth models (Solow, 
1956). Macroeconomic stability is, in turn, considered a precondition for economic recovery 
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during transition in the post-communist world (Fischer, Sahay, & Vegh, 1996). Hence, the 
base model is:  
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + εit                                                                                                        (1) 
 
Where Yit is a measure of economic development limited to economic growth and 
operationalized through an annual real GDP growth rate, Yit-1 is one-period-lagged economic 
growth. K stands for the investment in physical capital measured through gross capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP. MS represents macroeconomic stability captured by 
annual consumer price inflation. The main source for the above variables is the World Bank 
electronic database.  
We begin the analysis with testing the key premise of our theoretical model that 
incongruence between the new legal institutions and our model's three dimensions is 
detrimental to economic growth: 
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3D_Cultureit + β4D_Structureit + β5D_Politicsit 
+ εit                                                                                                                                                                                                               (2)                                             
Where D_ is a measure of incongruence expressed through the distance between the 
quality of a country's legal institutions and one of the three dimensions and calculated as 
follows:  Distance = [(Legal institutional index - Dimensions' value) / Dimensions' value]. 
Since cultural measures are available on a cross-sectional basis, we calculate annual distances 
between legal institutions and the cultural dimension as differences between legal scores for 
every year and the constant cultural scores.  
We further include formal legal institutions (LI) into the base model: 
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lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3LIit + εit                                                                                      (3) 
 
Similarly, we include political dimension indexes (PI) into the base model as: 
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3PIit + εit                                                                                      (4)                                                                   
 
At this stage of the analysis, we are able to compare the coefficient estimates of the 
legal institutional variable, LI, and the political dimension variable, PI, between the drift and 
path-breaking subsamples. 
We further analyze the political dimension’s role in mitigating the detrimental impact 
of incongruence on economic growth by allowing interactions between the distance variables 
and the political dimension's measures: 
 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3PIit + β4D_Culture it + β5D_Structureit + 
β6PI*D_Culture it + β7PI*D_Structureit + εit                                                                                                               (5) 
 
Where PI*D_Culture and PI*D_Structure are interaction terms between the political 
indexes and distances that legal institutions develop to culture or economic structure 
respectively.  
We proceed with exploring the impact of political indexes on the quality of legal 
institutional change: 
 
LI_change it=αLIit-1 + ρ1Life_expectit+Latitudei+ ρ2PIit + μit                                                        (6) 
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Where LI_change stands for an annual change in the legal institutional index during 
the period analyzed and is calculated as [(Legal Institutional Index in year t - Legal 
Institutional Index in year (t-1)] / Legal Institutional Index in year (t-1). LI it-1 is a lagged 
value of the legal institutional index, PI is political indexes, and Life_expect stands for life 
expectancy as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Islam (2004).  
 
4. Empirical Results  
Our data confirm the idea that path-breaking institutional reforms are more likely to produce 
institutions that are incongruent with our model's three dimensions (see table 2). The absolute 
values of the distance variables are greater for the path-breaking subsamples than for the drift 
subsamples. The only exception is the distance to the political institutions’ quality that proves 
greater in the drift phase than at critical junctures.  
We also receive support for our key assumption that the distance between legal 
institutions and the three dimensions may worsen a transition country's economic 
performance (see table 3). A similar relationship is found for the extended drift subsample, 
but only partially confirmed for the extended path-breaking subsample (see table 4). The lack 
of complete evidence for the extended path-breaking subsample can be attributed to a great 
number of missing values for the cultural variable. Concerning the political elites index, this 
may also mean that at critical junctures, what matters is not the distance that legal institutions 
develop to the political dimension, but the actual quality of this political dimension.   
[insert Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 here] 
Our empirical results also confirm the idea of heterogeneity in the impact of legal and 
political indexes on the economic growth. Legal institutions strongly affect growth rates of 
economies operating within the institutions formed via drift-phase institutional change (see 
tables 5 and 6).When the analysis shifts to the path-breaking subsamples, we still establish a 
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positive relationship between legal institutional indexes and growth rates but this impact is 
substantially smaller compared to the drift subsamples. This is in line with Hypothesis 1. 
These results stand up to the alternative model specification choice and to the exclusion of 
resource-rich countries from the analysis.  
[insert Table 5 and Table 6 here] 
Tables 7 to 10 juxtapose the impact of the political dimension on economic growth 
between the drift and critical juncture subsamples. The results are largely consistent with 
hypothesis 2 and suggest that economies operating within a path-breaking institutional 
framework are more sensitive to the quality of their political sector, especially concerning 
political elites. In the case of the drift subsamples, it is more important that strong political 
institutions exist to allow these economies to grow faster. The results also remain robust to 
alternative model specification choices or to the exclusion of resource rich countries from the 
extended subsamples. 
[insert Table 7, Table 8, Table 9  and Table 10 here] 
To further understand the political dimension’s role at critical junctures, we introduce 
interactions between political indexes and the distance between legal institutions and our 
model's dimensions. The negative main effect (see table 11) suggests that increasing the 
distance to the cultural or structural dimensions may slow down economic growth. The 
positive coefficient estimates on the interaction terms further suggest that the mature political 
environment may cushion the negative impact of this distance, supporting hypothesis 3. The 
interaction effect is especially strong for the extended path-breaking subsample.  
[insert Table 11 here] 
Our results also indicate that during the path-breaking institutional reforms, the 
political dimension’s quality is instrumental in building legal institutions (see table 12), 
especially concerning the quality of political elites. By contrast, a drift-phase institutional 
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change is relatively independent from the quality of political elites but proves influenced by 
political institutions’ quality. Similarly, the distance variables' negative impact on the legal 
institutional change can be mitigated when the political dimension’s quality improves (see 
table 13). Both findings are consistent with hypothesis 4.  
[insert Table 12 and Table 13 here] 
Overall, the empirical analysis supports the original hypotheses. Moreover, the results 
can be considered robust given the selected robustness check strategies: (1) the drift 
subsample included economically developing countries to avoid the difference in coefficients 
being caused by variances in the level of economic or institutional maturity between the two 
country groups; (2) we included non-post-communist countries in the path-breaking 
subsample to verify whether the specificities found for post-communist countries are 
universal or unique to the post-communist world; (3) we eliminated resource rich countries 
and small economies from both subsamples. The list of such countries was retrieved from 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). One should note that the results for transition economies 
(the base path-breaking subsample) show slight peculiarities as compared to other countries 
from the extended path-breaking subsample. We believe that this difference is due to 
specificities of the socialist regime. While Communism represented a dictatorship, it was 
characterized by relatively high industrialization levels, albeit militarized to a great extent, a 
highly educated labor force, high levels of urbanization, and extended social programs. 
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study introduces the idea that institutional grafting is shaped by three forces: cultural, 
structural, and political. The success of institutional reforms is viewed as dependent not only 
on the actual quality of newly introduced legal institutions but also on the level of congruence 
that these institutions develop to the three dimensions. The potential size of this congruence 
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is considered a function of the phase in which such institutions emerge. Drift-phase 
institutional change produces legal institutions that are congruent with the logic of the three 
dimensions and that promote economic development. Path-breaking institutional change in 
contrast leads to the emergence of institutions that develop distances to the defined 
dimensions and that, thereby, have only a limited impact on growth rates. In this case, the 
actual quality of the political dimension will predetermine both a local economy's growth 
dynamics and the success of institutional change.  
Future research is needed to eliminate three major limitations of our study. First, a 
more careful grouping of countries for both subsamples is necessary to eliminate stark 
heterogeneities in their political, economic, social, and historical characteristics. Second, one 
should consider integrating countries with unstable regime trends into the analysis. Finally, 
alternative economic development measures should be used to demonstrate the robustness of 
our findings on the impact that the mode of institution building has on patterns of economic 
progress in the world. 
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 Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables of the Extended Subsamples 
 
VARIABLES No. of 
observatio
ns 
Mean SD Min. Max. 
The extended drift subsample       
GDP per capita growth 528 2.839 3.521 -5.930 31.800 
Legal institutions  426 0.720 0.193 0.125 1.000 
The political dimension       
Political institutions 440   0.658 0.274 0.118 1.000 
Political elites 449 0.631 0.241 0.098 1.000 
The cultural dimension  300 0.418 0.258 0.070 1.000 
The structural dimension Not available 
Distance to the political dimension      
Distance to political institutions 384 0.276 0.745 -0.437 4.214 
Distance to political elites 383 0.175 0.312 -0.562 1.873 
Distance to the cultural dimension 236 1.501 1.666 -0.483 7.613 
Distance to the structural dimension Not available 
Corruption perception index 462 6.236 2.436 1.400 10.000 
Gross capital formation 534 23.277 8.185 8.000 114.000 
Inflation 526 4.129 4.740 -13.800 34.700 
Life expectancy 540 73.156 9.054 35.000 85.000 
Legal institutional change 383 0.017 0.179 -0.767 1.422 
Latitude 540  0.373 0.202 0.014 0.711 
The extended path-breaking subsample      
GDP per capita growth 492    3.648 4.319 -17.690 26.000 
Legal institutions 369 0.532 0.126 0.198 0.906 
The political dimension      
Political institutions 420 0.587 0.147 0.212 0.851 
Political elites 418 0.414 0.128 0.194 0.713 
The cultural dimension 384  0.279 0.163 0.095 0.825 
The structural dimension 252 0.683 0.186 0.000 1.000 
Distance to the political dimension      
Distance to political institutions 337 -0.087 0.272 -0.622 1.681 
Distance to political elites 336 0.312 0.343 -0.344 1.403 
Distance to the cultural dimension  284   1.605 1.472 -0.596 5.485 
Distance to the structural dimension  174    -0.187 0.169 -0.585 0.711 
Corruption perception index 397 3.395 1.164 0.400 6.900 
Gross capital formation 502 23.476 7.110 6.000 75.000 
Inflation 502 9.894 13.061 -9.600 121.600 
Life expectancy 504 67.486 8.681 41.000 80.000 
Legal institutional change 327 0.030 0.185 -0.432 1.595 
Latitude 492   0.368 0.185  0.056 0.667 
Note: The legal institutional scores and the three dimensions' variables are rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. 
The minimum and maximum values of the respective variables from the pooled sample are used as benchmarks 
for rescaling. 
  
Table 2 Mean Values for the Distance Variables, by Mode of Institutional Grafting 
 
VARIABLES The drift subsample The path-breaking subsample 
Base Extended  Base Extended  
Distance to the political dimension     
Distance to political institutions’ 
quality 
0.087 0.276 -0.017 -0.087 
Distance to political elites’ quality 0.084 0.175 0.305 0.312 
Distance to the cultural dimension 1.037 1.501 1.682 1.605 
Distance to the structural dimension Not available Not available   -0.187 Not available 
 
  
Table 3 The Impact of the Distance Variables on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples 
 
VARIABLES The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.098*** 0.028 -0.060 0.056*** 
 (0.025) (0.049) (0.044) (0.015) 
Ln(Capital) 0.563*** 0.211 0.506*** 0.247** 
 (0.049) (0.151) (0.153) (0.118) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.133*** -0.108*** -0.079*** -0.115*** 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.013) 
Distance to the cultural dimension  -0.141***    
 (0.042)    
Distance to the political dimension     
Distance to political institutions’ 
quality 
 -0.183*   
  (0.089)   
Distance to political elites’ quality   -0.317***  
   (0.082)  
Distance to the structural dimension    -0.598** 
    (0.223) 
     
Number of instruments  21 19 19 21 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.424 0.322 0.269 0.410 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.322 0.453 0.458 0.252 
Number of observations 130 105 105 130 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Results are only reported for the base path-breaking subsample. We do not 
run a similar analysis for the base drift subsample due to a great number of missing values for the cultural 
variable and the lack of data for the structural variable. All the variables specified in the model are included in 
the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the first, second and third lags of the respective variables; 
time dummies appear in the ivstyle option.  
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
 Table 4 The Impact of the Distance Variables on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.145*** -0.216*** 0.098*** 0.021 0.245*** 0.254*** 
 (0.041) (0.004) (0.034) (0.051) (0.043) (0.046) 
Ln(Capital) 2.771*** 3.498*** 2.084*** 0.068 0.978*** 0.614* 
 (0.658) (0.274) (0.581) (0.174) (0.332) (0.304) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.396*** -0.307*** -0.336*** -0.158*** -0.039 -0.113*** 
 (0.103) (0.030) (0.064) (0.032) (0.053) (0.036) 
Distance to the cultural dimension  -0.610***   0.448***   
 (0.086)   (0.088)   
Distance to the political dimension       
Distance to political institutions’ quality  -0.222***   -0.702**  
  (0.033)   (0.282)  
Distance to political elites’ quality    -1.082***   0.378* 
   (0.373)   (0.197) 
Number of instruments  21 35 27 29 27 27 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.383 0.278 0.404 0.451 0.192 0.136 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.547 0.223 0.390 0.105 0.566 0.354 
Number of observations       
Number of countries 140 186 186 192 190 190 
Number of instruments  24 42 42 32 40 40 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option; time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. Column (1): 
Instruments are restricted to the first, second and third lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Instruments are increased to the seventh lags of the respective variables; 
Column (3): Instruments used are from the second to the sixth lags of the respective variables; Columns (4, 5 and 6): Instruments used are from the fifth to the ninth lags of 
the respective variables.  
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 Table 5 The Impact of Legal Institutions on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples  
 
VARIABLES The base drift subsample The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.113 -0.095*** 0.216** 0.121 0.069 0.166*** 0.077 0.214 
 (0.133) (0.019) (0.083) (0.141) (0.061) (0.036) (0.070) (0.137) 
Ln(Capital) 3.790*** 4.154*** 3.340*** 4.813** -0.500 -0.475 0.508* -0.492 
 (1.303) (0.537) (1.106) (2.018) (0.517) (0.295) (0.282) (0.544) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.343 -0.490*** -0.514*** -0.744** -0.059 -0.083** -0.255*** -0.120** 
 (0.214) (0.084) (0.148) (0.316) (0.044) (0.034) (0.051) (0.053) 
Legal institutions 10.440*** 2.098** 9.473*** 6.705* -0.630 0.759*** 0.421 1.146** 
 (2.867) (1.008) (2.400) (3.574) (0.871) (0.208) (0.571) (0.475) 
         
Number of instruments  13 21 17 13 13 21 17 13 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.252 0.507 0.239 0.123 0.196 0.333 0.178 0.140 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.462 0.104 0.567 0.287 0.289 0.304 0.221 0.347 
Number of observations 128 128 128 128 130 130 130 130 
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 21 21 21 21 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the third, 
fourth and fifth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): In addition to the above specification choice, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (3): An 
alternative model specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the ninth and tenth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): An alternative model 
specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the fifth lags of the respective variables and omitting the collapse sub-option. 
*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
  
Table 6 The Impact of Legal Institutions on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples 
 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.098 -0.227*** 0.071* -0.205*** 0.011 0.060*** -0.012 0.033* 
 (0.064) (0.011) (0.037) (0.011) (0.074) (0.020) (0.076) (0.019) 
Ln(Capital) 3.294*** 3.021*** 3.063*** 2.451*** 0.628 0.701** 0.933** -0.002 
 (0.801) (0.384) (0.848) (0.611) (0.441) (0.289) (0.425) (0.092) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.485*** -0.491*** -0.433*** -0.357*** -0.085 -0.081** -0.084* -0.143*** 
 (0.120) (0.099) (0.130) (0.042) (0.060) (0.031) (0.044) (0.024) 
Legal institutions 1.883* 3.717*** 4.623*** 2.361*** 1.876** 1.656*** 1.497** 1.915*** 
 (0.933) (0.550) (0.799) (0.311) (0.693) (0.414) (0.594) (0.331) 
         
Number of instruments  26 35 26 33 26 35 26 33 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.292 0.348 0.209 0.567 0.125 0.338 0.123 0.214 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.319 0.195 0.815 0.209 0.092 0.103 0.153 0.106 
Number of observations 236 236 190 190 227 227 213 213 
Number of countries 42 42 33 33 40 40 37 37 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the ninth 
and tenth lags of the respective variables. The collapse sub-option is not included. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (2): An alternative model 
specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the sixth lags of the respective variables and including the collapse sub-option; Column (3): Resource rich 
countries are excluded from the analysis; specification choice of Model 1 is applied; Column (4): Resource rich countries are excluded from the analysis; the 
specification choice from Model 2 is applied with the collapse suboption added in order to keep the number of instruments less than the number of countries. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
 Table 7 The Impact of Political Institutions on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples 
  
VARIABLES The base drift subsample The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.087*** -0.144*** -0.599*** -0.167 -0.021* 0.464** 
 (0.029) (0.011) (0.116) (0.099) (0.011) (0.195) 
Ln(Capital) -0.436 1.279** 7.508*** -0.205 0.429*** 1.374*** 
 (1.168) (0.609) (0.930) (0.360) (0.062) (0.441) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.118 -0.349*** -0.421*** -0.039 -0.113*** -0.455*** 
 (0.101) (0.066) (0.137) (0.034) (0.026) (0.117) 
Political institutions 11.280*** 3.188* 4.542** 4.608 1.068 2.125** 
 (2.194) (1.733) (1.826) (5.167) (1.547) (0.770) 
       
Number of instruments  13 19 15 13 19 15 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.123 0.359 0.329 0.066 0.243 0.124 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > 
z) 
0.110 0.079 0.107 0.122 0.338 0.636 
Number of observations 100 100 100 116 116 116 
Number of countries 22 22 22 21 21 21 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the first, 
second and third lags of the respective variables; (2) Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; (3) An alternative model specification choice is used 
such as restricting instruments only to the tenth lags of the respective variables and omitting the collapse sub-option. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
Table 8 The Impact of Political Institutions on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples  
 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.200*** -0.191*** -0.214*** -0.219*** -0.057* -0.062*** -0.043 0.037 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003) (0.029) (0.018) (0.038) (0.034) 
Ln(Capital) 2.119*** 2.736*** 2.875*** 4.198*** 0.150 0.036 0.204 0.085 
 (0.626) (0.219) (0.767) (0.204) (0.137) (0.023) (0.185) (0.112) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.224*** -0.253*** -0.297*** -0.254*** -0.032 -0.037*** -0.083*** -0.076*** 
 (0.052) (0.035) (0.072) (0.022) (0.021) (0.012) (0.030) (0.020) 
Political institutions 3.236*** 3.320*** 4.403*** 3.140*** 7.139*** 8.230*** 7.847*** 4.341*** 
 (0.546) (0.389) (1.269) (0.533) (1.469) (0.747) (2.029) (0.743) 
         
Number of instruments  33 39 23 31 33 39 23 31 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.417 0.268 0.321 0.371 0.238 0.433 0.142 0.154 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.153 0.183 0.202 0.370 0.482 0.467 0.566 0.273 
Number of observations 191 191 191 148 205 205 205 190 
Number of countries 43 43 43 33 40 40 40 37 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments used are from the first to 
the eighth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (3) An alternative model specification choice 
is used such as reducing the instruments to the fourth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): Resource rich countries are omitted from the analysis, the 
specification choice from Model 2 is applied with instruments reduced to the sixth lags of the respective variables.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
Table 9 The Impact of Political Elites on Economic Growth for the Base Subsamples 
VARIABLES The base drift subsample The base path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.069 0.052 0.189*** 0.205 0.313*** 0.284*** 
 (0.147) (0.054) (0.009) (0.199) (0.091) (0.053) 
Ln(Capital) 4.021 2.357** 2.336*** -1.518* 0.022 0.124 
 (2.362) (1.028) (0.669) (0.780) (0.194) (0.157) 
Ln(Inflation) -1.146** -0.679*** -0.798*** -0.088 -0.227** -0.296*** 
 (0.527) (0.207) (0.055) (0.139) (0.091) (0.057) 
Political elites -27.220* -1.470 -0.422 9.058** 3.765** 5.715*** 
 (15.560) (3.543) (2.225) (3.893) (1.529) (0.991) 
       
Number of instruments  9 15 19 9 15 19 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.375 0.371 0.354 0.160 0.161 0.248 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.348 0.141 0.210 0.616 0.736 0.532 
Number of observations 100 100 100 116 116 116 
Number of countries 22 22 22 21 21 21 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the second 
and third lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Column (3): An alternative model specification choice 
is used such as increasing instruments to the fourth lags of the respective variables. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
Table 10 The Impact of Political Elites on Economic Growth for the Extended Subsamples 
VARIABLES The extended drift subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 -0.263*** -0.065*** -0.079*** -0.007 -0.019 0.199*** 0.025 0.217*** 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.025) (0.008) (0.041) (0.010) (0.036) (0.032) 
Ln(Capital) 1.408*** 2.194*** 2.111*** 2.391*** 0.136 0.685*** 0.973*** 0.852*** 
 (0.393) (0.095) (0.166) (0.051) (0.099) (0.070) (0.117) (0.044) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.346*** -0.356*** -0.409*** -0.416*** -0.111*** -0.146*** -0.250*** -0.208*** 
 (0.068) (0.030) (0.066) (0.038) (0.025) (0.016) (0.037) (0.026) 
Political elites -6.330*** 0.292 -0.895 1.157** 4.308*** 3.427*** 8.369*** 5.439*** 
 (2.085) (1.076) (1.310) (0.565) (1.063) (0.545) (1.481) (1.001) 
         
Number of instruments  27 39 34 34 27 39 34 34 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.732 0.360 0.290 0.400 0.186 0.333 0.359 0.396 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.249 0.362 0.402 0.623 0.402 0.556 0.755 0.756 
Number of observations 194 194 194 151 205 205 205 190 
Number of countries 44 44 44 34 40 40 40 37 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments used are from the first to 
the fifth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): An alternative model specification choice is applied such as allowing instruments to vary from the third to the 
tenth lags of the respective variables; Column (3): An alternative model specification choice is used such as restricting instruments to the fourth lags of the respective 
variables and omitting the collapse suboption; Column (4): Resource rich countries are omitted from the analysis. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
  
Table 11 The Impact of Interactions between the Political Dimension and the Distance Variables on Economic Growth for the Path-Breaking 
Subsamples 
 
VARIABLES The base path-breaking subsample The extended path-breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Growth rate)t-1 0.184* 0.529*** 0.784 -0.005 -0.079*** 0.261*** 
 (0.094) (0.170) (0.516) (0.104) (0.028) (0.080) 
Political institutions -0.824  9.319**  -1.077  
 (1.886)  (3.904)  (1.912)  
Political elites  0.517  9.612***  -0.641 
  (4.302)  (2.909)  (2.684) 
Distance to the cultural dimension  -0.210 -1.807   -0.045 -1.212** 
 (0.562) (1.276)   (0.360) (0.545) 
Distance to the cultural dimension* 0.791    1.279*  
* Political institutions (0.973)    (0.641)  
Distance to the cultural dimension*  4.222*    3.511** 
* Political elites  (2.358)    (1.445) 
Distance to the structural dimension    -1.123 -3.986   
   (7.939) (3.564)   
Distance to the structural dimension*    3.036    
* Political institutions   (15.980)    
Distance to the structural dimension*     11.060   
* Political elites    (9.324)   
Number of instruments  17 12 12 17 27 22 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.538 0.134 0.305 0.186 0.197 0.134 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.151 0.490 0.413 0.396 0.163 0.958 
Number of observations 105 105 105 105 158 158 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 32 32 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. The results for the control variables (lnCapital and lnInflation) are not reported due to space limits. Column (1): Instruments are 
restricted to the fifth and sixth lags of the respective variables; Column (2): Instruments are restricted to the second lags of the respective variables; Column (3): 
Instruments are restricted to the tenth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): Instruments are restricted to the fifth and sixth lags of the respective variables; 
Column (5): Instruments used are from the first to the fourth lags of the respective variables; Column (6): Instruments are restricted to the eighth, ninth and tenth lags 
of the respective variables.  * p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
  
Table 12 The Impact of the Political Dimension on Legal Institutional Change, by Mode of Institutional Grafting 
VARIABLES The drift subsample The path-breaking subsample 
Base Extended  Base Extended  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Legal institutionst-1 -1.331*** -0.253** -0.880*** -0.588*** -1.561*** -1.397*** -1.943*** -1.869*** 
 (0.029) (0.099) (0.028) (0.092) (0.061) (0.116) (0.039) (0.109) 
Life expectancy -0.013*** -0.005*** 0.016*** 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.025*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) 
Political institutions 0.509***  0.467***  -0.765**  0.271**  
 (0.120)  (0.031)  (0.337)  (0.132)  
Political elites  0.127  -0.168  1.792***  1.807*** 
  (0.131)  (0.331)  (0.591)  (0.403) 
         
Number of instruments  18 14 38 22 18 14 38 22 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.218 0.153 0.216 0.185 0.459 0.331 0.404 0.123 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.484 0.635 0.267 0.234 0.123 0.210 0.122 0.165 
Number of observations 132 132 256 256 102 102 219 219 
Number of countries 22 22 43 43 20 20 41 41 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. Since 
formal institutions may influence the quality of life and impact life expectancy, we consider this variable endogenous and insert it into the gmmstyle option to 
instrument it with the lagged values of the variable itself. The latitude variable is considered strictly exogenous and is included in the ivstyle option. Columns (1): 
Instruments are restricted to the first, second and third lags of the respective variables; Columns (2): Instruments are restricted to the second and third lags of the 
respective variables; Columns (3): Instruments used are from the third to the tenth lags of the respective variables; Columns (4): Instruments used are from the second 
to the fifth lags of the respective variables. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
 Table 13 The Impact of the Distance Variables on Legal Institutional Grafting for the Path-
Breaking Subsamples 
 
VARIABLES The base path-breaking subsample The extended path-
breaking subsample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Legal institutional change t-1 -0.295*** -0.304*** -0.254*** -0.213*** -0.304*** -0.279*** 
 (0.006) (0.026) (0.011) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) 
Life expectancy -0.074*** -0.037*** 0.009 0.042** -0.024*** -0.013*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) 
Political institutions -2.539***  -0.656  -2.576***  
 (0.622)  (0.726)  (0.321)  
Political elites  -5.444***  -1.844***  -2.998*** 
  (0.464)  (0.588)  (0.349) 
Distance to the cultural dimension -0.098 -0.557***   -0.055 -0.073 
 (0.141) (0.180)   (0.101) (0.065) 
Distance to the cultural dimension* 0.618**    0.445***  
*Political institutions (0.229)    (0.151)  
Distance to the cultural dimension*  1.626***    0.618*** 
*Political elites  (0.226)    (0.128) 
Distance to the structural dimension   -1.716** -2.038**   
   (0.703) (0.755)   
Distance to the structural dimension*   4.646***    
*Political institutions   (1.348)    
Distance to the structural dimension*    7.362***   
*Political elites    (1.927)   
       
Number of instruments  19 19 19 19 27 27 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.228 0.272 0.274 0.304 0.299 0.269 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.626 0.760 0.913 0.300 0.168 0.560 
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 162 162 
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 31 31 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle 
option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. We restrict instruments to the first, second and third lags of 
the respective variables for the base path-breaking subsample. In the case of the extended path-breaking 
subsample, instruments used are from the fifth to the ninth lags of the respective variables. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
 Appendix 1 
 
List of Countries Used in the Analysis 
 
Drift-phase subsamples Path-breaking subsamples 
Base Extended Base Extended 
Australia  Australia  Albania  Albania  
Austria  Austria  Armenia Argentina  
Belgium  Bahrain  Azerbaijan Armenia 
China  Belgium  Bulgaria  Azerbaijan 
Colombia  Botswana Croatia Bangladesh 
Costa Rica  Cameroon  Czech Republic  Benin 
Denmark  Canada Estonia Bolivia 
Finland  China  Georgia Brazil  
Germany  Colombia  Hungary Bulgaria  
India Costa Rica  Kyrgyzstan  Croatia 
Ireland  Denmark  Latvia  Czech Republic  
Israel Egypt Lithuania  El Salvador  
Italy  Equatorial Guinea  Macedonia  Estonia 
Jamaica Finland  Moldova  Georgia 
Japan France  Poland Guatemala 
Netherlands, the   Germany  Romania  Guyana  
New Zealand  Greece  Russia  Hungary 
Norway  Guinea Serbia  Indonesia 
Sweden  India Slovakia  Korea South  
Switzerland  Ireland  Slovenia  Kyrgyzstan  
United Kingdom, the   Israel Ukraine  Latvia  
United States, the  Italy   Lesotho  
 Jamaica  Lithuania  
 Japan  Macedonia  
 Luxembourg   Madagascar  
 Mauritius   Malawi 
 Mexico  Mali  
 Morocco  Moldova  
 Netherlands, the    Mongolia  
 New Zealand   Mozambique  
 Norway   Panama 
 Oman   Paraguay 
 Portugal   Philippines  
 Rwanda   Poland 
 Saudi Arabia   Romania  
 Singapore  Russia  
 Sri Lanka   Serbia  
 Sweden   Slovakia  
 Switzerland   Slovenia  
 Syria   Ukraine  
 Trinidad   Uruguay 
 Tunisia   Zambia  
 United Kingdom, the     
 United States, the     
 Vietnam    
 
